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Market Integration and Regulation: Europe after 1992 
Giandomenico Majone
European University Institute, Florence, Italy
1. Introduction: Piqou vs. Musgrave
The Treaty of Rome envisages a single European market free of 
restrictions on the movement of people, goods, services, and 
capital. The logic of the Treaty seems to imply that once the 
individual markets of the member states of the European Community 
(EC) have been integrated, no further intervention in the economy 
is either necessary or desirable -- except to ensure that 
competition in the common market is not distorted and, arguably, 
to correct other kinds of market failure.
(/ l n  Musgrave 1 s well-known classification of the economic 
functions of government, these regulatory interventions belong to 
the allocative branch. The Rome Treaty assigns virtually no 
redistributive functions to the Community level, the only 
significant exceptions being the Guarantee Section of the 
Agricultural Fund and the Social Fund. Together with the Regional 
Development Fund (established by the Paris Summit of 1972) and 
development aid, these redistributive programmes absorbe more 
than 70 per cent of the Community budget. However, the EC budget 
amounts to about 1.2 per cent of Community GDP and less than 4 
per cent of the central government spending of member states; 
hence it is much too small to have any significant impact on the 
interpersonal, interregional or international distribution of
Paper presented at the Conference on "Production Organization, 
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wealth. Because of its small size, the Community budget —  which 
by Art.199 of the Treaty must be balanced —  cannot be used as an 
instrument of macroeconomic stabilization policy, either.^
In short, although Musgrave's functional classification is 
still widely used in public discussions and in influential 
documents about the future of the Community such as the Padoa- 
Schioppa report (Padoa-Schioppa et al., 1987), its usefulness for 
understanding the likely evolution of the economic system of the 
EC is doubtful. The Musgravian scheme not only presupposes the 
existence of a full-fledged government -- while the EC will 
remain in a pre-federal stage for at least another decade —  but 
also reflects an interventionist philosophy at variance with the 
economic liberalism of the Treaty of Rome. Reliance on the 
Musgravian classification can mislead one into thinking that the 
integrated European market will be something a good deal larger 
than, but qualitatively similar to, the twelve national markets 
that compose it.
/in fact, the Community-wide market will be quite different 
from the mixed economies which historically evolved in the member 
states. On the one hand, the single market cannot come into being 
and operate effectively unless the capacity of national 
governments to intervene in the economy is drastically reduced. 
On the other hand, the majority of European voters are willing 
neither to accept a complete reversal of the prevailing 
socioeconomic order, nor to transfer to the Community 
institutions the powers necessary to carry out all the 
traditional functions of government. The completion of the 
Internal Market will ultimately reflect a compromise between 
these conflicting constraints and, as Jacques Pelkmans has 
rightly observed, the regulation issue —  what, how, and at what 
level of government to regulate —  is the core of the emergent 
compromise (Pelkmans, 1989)!^.
Regulation is a distinctive form of policy-making mainly 




























































































externalities, monopoly power, public goods, inadequate or 
asymmetrically distributed information. According to the market- 
failure approach, state intervention should be limited to the 
provision of public goods, such as environmental protection or 
public health measures, and to increase the efficiency of the 
economic system by the use of regulatory instruments. This view 
of the economic rationale of government is firmly rooted in the 
Pigovian tradition. In The Economics of Welfare. Pigou not only 
discussed at length external economies and diseconomies and the 
case for government intervention, but also expressed his support 
of the American approach to regulation by means of independent 
regulatory bodies like the Interstate Commerce Commission (Coase, 
1988) .
<̂ tt is fair to point out that recent years have seen a 
considerable broadening of the areas of interest of market- 
failure analysts beyond the cases envisaged by Pigou, especially 
to include incomplete markets and information failures (Stiglitz, 
1988). An important recent development is the recognition that 
market failures provide only a prima facie case for intervention, 
since the costs of public intervention may exceed the benefits. 
Hence "regulatory failure" must also be considered. In fact, I 
shall argue that regulatory failures are even more important than 
market failures for explaining the delegation of regulatory 
powers to a supranational authority :>
A frequent criticism of the market failure approach is that 
it is a normative, rather than a positive, approach. It provides 
a basis for identifying situations where the government ought to 
do something, tempered by consideration of regulatory failure. 
However, many political scientists and economists believe that 
analysts should focus their attention not on normative issues but 
on describing the consequences of government programmes and the 
nature of the political processes. Normative analysis, it is 
said, is irrelevant since policy outcomes depend, not on norms or 




























































































the political process, the incentives facing various participants 
in the process, and the changing configurations of power and 
interests in society.
The normative-positive dichotomy has played a large role in 
methodoYógicàl discussions in the social sciences at least since 
Max Weber. It is not my intention to contribute to the debate, 
but since in this paper normative and positive arguments are 
intertwined, a few words about this issue may be justified. The 
first point I wish to make is that in the social sciences, 
including economics, the distinction between normative and 
positive theories is much less sharp than positivists and 
neopositivists used to think. Thus, in an important survey paper 
on "Regulation in Theory and Practice" / Joskow and Noll have 
called "normative analysis as a positive theory" (or NPT) the 
theory which regards market failure as the motivating reason for 
the introduction of public regulation (Joskow and Noll, 1981; 
Peltzman, 1989). “
The characterization is appropriate since the normative 
theory is often successful in explaining the origin and 
development of many regulatory policies. As Peltzman (1989:17) 
has written.
If there is an empirical basis for the NPT's 
continuing attraction for economists, it is 
probably its apparent success as an entry theory. 
Consider Hotelling's classic statement in 1938 of 
the natural monopoly version of the NPT. In this 
purely theoretical piece, railroads and utilities 
are presumed, without much evidence, to be the main 
real-world examples of natural monopoly. They also 
occupied most of the regulatory (including public 
ownership) effort when Hotelling wrote. This 
correspondence between the NPT and the real-world 
allocation of regulatory effort seems striking. Now 
consider the postwar expansion of regulation. In 
terms of the resources involved, the biggest single 
chunk is probably accounted for by environmental 
regulation, where the externalities aspect of the 




























































































Since Peltzman gives no reasons for the predictive success of a 
purely normative theory, I would like to sketch a possible 
explanation. A key point is that the relationship between social 
theory and social institutions is a dialectic one: the theory 
describes and evaluates those institutions, but at the same time 
those institutions which would otherwise be disconnected and 
unorganized, become conceptualized and systematized, and thus 
transformed, by theory. The dialectic nature of the relationship 
between theories and institutions has been clearly grasped by 
some legal scholars. According to Harold J. Berman, for example, 
the law contains within itself a legal science, a "meta-law", by 
which it can be both analysed and evaluated. In this way, legal 
argument becomes a constituent activity of the legal process 
itself, and the development of legal institutions is not 
artificially separated from the development of theories about 
those institutions (Berman, 1983).
A related point is also helpful for understanding the 
relation between normative discourse and institutional or policy 
change. Even when change is best explained by the political or 
economic power of groups seeking selfish ends, those who attempt 
to justify those changes must appeal to the merits of particular 
issues. Legislators, administrators, analysts, and the public at 
large wish to know whether the change is justified. All of them 
seek standards against which to judge the success of a policy and 
the merits of specific programmes initiated within the framework 
of that policy (Breyer, 1982; Majone, 1989). This explains why 
normative arguments are important for understanding policy 
developments and institutional change, even when they do not 
significantly influence specific policy-decisions.
This paper is about policy development and institutional 
change in the European Community. I have argued that because 
regulation is such an important part of EC policy-making, the 
market failure approach —  viewed as both a normative and a 




























































































than Musgrave's functional classification for understanding the 
emergence of new structures of governance in an increasingly 
integrated European market. However, before discussing the 
problem of how regulatory authority should/will be distributed 
among different levels of government, we must explain the 
enormous growth of Community regulation in the last decades -- a 
development probably unanticipated by the drafters of the Treaty 
of Rome.
2. The Growth of Community Regulation
It is becoming increasingly difficult to understand the 
domestic policies of member states without taking Community 
legislation into consideration. This is particularly true for 
economic and social regulation. I do not mean to suggest that EC 
regulators attempt to replace or even closely supervise national 
regulators. Such a goal would be politically infeasible at 
present, and would in any case require a large increase of 
specialist staffs in Brussels and the creation of European 
regulatory agencies and inspectorates.
Comparing national and Community rule making in a number of 
policy fields one can see instead two different regulatory 
systems, with the second designed to coordinate and complement 
rather than replace or challenge the first. At the same time, one 
must keep in mind that Community regulation, when agreed by the 
Council, has primacy over national legislation. Hence, regardless 
of the intentions of the Commission, national regulators tend to 
lose power in an increasing number of areas (Vipod, 1989).
Economists and political scientists have paid insufficient 
attention to these developments. The vast literature on European 
integration and on policy-making in the European Community 
contains very few studies of the political economy of regulation 
at the Community level. So far, the. Eost significant 
contributions to the study of EC regulation have come from legal 




























































































questions than with substantive policy evaluations or general 
theoretical explanations. Given the importance of Community 
regulation in so many areas of economic and social life, from 
banking and technical standardization to environmental and 
consumer protection, this scarcity of regulatory policy analyses 
is surprising and can only be explained by the absence of a 
framework.
letition pdlYcy and measures necessary for the 
integration of national markets, few regulatory policies or 
programmes are specifically mentioned in the Treaty of Rome. The 
transport and energy policies which could have given rise to 
significant regulatory activities, have remained largely 
undeveloped. How, then, can one explain the continuous growth of 
Community regulation, even in the absence of explicit legal
mandates? Take the case of environmental protection, an area not 
even mentioned by the Treaty of Rome. In the two decades from 
1967 to 1987, when the Single European Act finally recognized the 
authority of the Community to legislate in this area, almost 200 
directives, regulations, and decisions were introduced by the 
Commission. Moreover, the rate of growth of environmental 
regulation appears to have been largely unaffected by the 
political vicissitudes, budgetary crises, and recurrent waves of 
Europessimism of the 1970s and early 1980s. From the single 
directive on preventing risks by testing of 1969 (L68/19.3.69) we 
pass to 10 directives/decisions in 1975, 13 in 1980, 20 in 1982, 
23 in 1984, 24 in 1985 and 17 in the six months immediately 
preceding passage of the Single European Act.
The case of environmental regulation is particularly 
striking, partly because of the political salience of 
environmental issues, but it is by no means unique. The volume 
and depth of Community regulation in the areas of consumer 
product safety, medical drug testing, banking and financial 
services and, of course, competition law is hardly less 




























































































by the Commission's White Paper on the completion of the internal 
market only represent the acceleration of a trend set in motion 
decades ago. The continuous growth of supranational regulation is 
not easily explained by traditional theories of Community policy­
making. At most, such theories suggest that the serious 
implementation gap that exists in the European Community may make 
it easier for the member states, and their representatives in the 
Council, to accept Commission proposals which they have no 
serious intention of applying. The main limitation of this 
argument is that it fails to differentiate between areas where 
policy development has been slow and uncertain (for example, 
transport, energy or research) and areas where significant policy 
development has taken place even in the absence of a clear legal 
basis.
Moreover, existing theories of Community policy-making do not 
usually draw any clear distinction between regulatory and other 
types of policies. Now, an important characteristic of regulatory 
policy making is the limited influence of budgetary limitations 
on the activities of regulators. The size of non-regulatory, 
direct-expenditure programmes is constrained by budgetary 
appropriations and, ultimately, by the size of government tax 
revenues. In contrast, the real costs of most regulatory 
programmes are borne directly by the firms and individuals who 
have to comply with them. Compared with these costs, the 
resources needed to produce the regulations are trivial.
It is difficult to overstate the significance of this 
structural difference between regulatory policies and policies 
involving the direct expenditure of public funds. The distinction 
is particularly important for the analysis of Community policy­
making, since not only the economic, but also the political and 
administrative costs of enforcing EC regulations are borne by the 
member states.
As already noted, the financial resources of the Community 




























































































handful of redistributive programmes. The remaining resources are 
insufficient to support large scale initiatives in areas like 
industrial policy, energy, research, or technological innovation. 
Given this constraint, the only way for the Commission to 
increase its role is to expand the scope of its regulatory 
activities.
Thus any satisfactory explanation of the remarkable growth of 
Community regulation must take into account both the desire of 
the Commission to increase its influence, and the possibility of 
escaping budgetary constraints by resorting to regulatory policy­
making. "Such an explanation differs not only from traditional" 
theories of Community policy-making, but also from the economic 
theory of bureaucracy as formulated, for example, by JFiskSfien 
Ni'skanenrs*‘model an administrative agency can maximize 
its budget, subject to the constraint that the budget covers the 
cost of producing a given level Q of service, because only the 
agency's managers know the true cost function C(Q). The funding 
body —  Congress or Parliament —  knows only its utility function 
U(Q) and thus cannot determine the level of Q such that the first 
order condition U'(Q) = C'(Q) is satisfied. This allows the 
agency to request a budget larger than the one which maximizes 
the net benefits of those who provide the funds.
/The crucial assumption of this principal-agent model is that 
the size of the budget is positively and monotonically related to 
such goals of a bureaucrat as "salary, the perquisites of office, 
public reputation, power, patronage, output of the bureau" 
(Niskanen, 1971:38). For the reasons given above, this is not a 
plausible hypothesis for a regulatory agency. In fact, public 
choice and other economic theories of regulation (Stigler, 1971; 
Peltzman, 1976; Phillips and Zecher, 1981; Beaker, 1983; Mackay 
et a l . , 1987 ) make no use of the hypothesis of budget
maximisation in modelling the behaviour of regulatory bodies. In 
these models, regulators maximise their utility not by concealing 




























































































regulation, to a variety of interest groups. Moreover, both 
Niskanen's model of budget maximisation and the economic theories 
of regulation assume that the type of service provided by the 
agency, though not the level of activity, is essentially fixed. 
In other words, the administrative or regulatory functions have 
already been assigned; the models only attempt to predict how 
those functions will be performed. In the case of developing 
supranational institution like the EC, the assignment problem, 
that is, the definition of competences, is the crucial one. This 
fact justifies our assumption that the EC Commission attempts to 
maximise, not its budget but its influence as measured by the 
scope of its competences. The available empirical evidence seems 
in fact to support the hypothesis that the utility function of 
the Commission is positively related to the scope rather than the 
scale of the service
Another importe in a complete explanation of the 
growth of Community regulation is the interest of multi-national, 
export-oriented industries in avoiding inconsistent and 
progressively more stringent regulations in various EC and non-EC 
countries. Community regulation can eliminate or at least reduce 
this risk.
similar phenomenon has been observed in the United States, 
where certain industries, faced with the danger of a significant 
loss of markets through state and local legislation, has strongly 
supported federal regulation ("preemptive federalism"). For 
example, the American automobile industry had good reasons to 
prefer federal regulation of air pollution because of the threat 
posed by different and inconsistent air pollution standards and 
also because it feared "a kind of political domino effect, in 
which one state legislature after another would set more and more 
stringent emission standards without regard to the costs and 
technical difficulties involved ...Federal legislation was 
preferable to state legislation -- particularly if federal 




























































































administrative agency rather than through symbolic appeals to 
cost-externalizing politicians" (Elliott et al., 1985:33
Thus the car industry, which during the early 1 s had 
successfully opposed federal emission standards for motor 
vehicles, abruptly reversed its position in mid-1965: provided 
that the federal standards would be set by a regulatory agency, 
and provided that they would preempt any state standards more 
stringent than California's, the industry would support federal 
legislation.
Analogous reasons explain the preference for Community 
solutions of some powerful and w e 1 1 -organized European 
industries. Consider, for example, the "Sixth Amendment" of 
Directive 67/548 on the classification, packaging, and labelling 
of dangerous substances. This amending Directive 79/831 does not 
prevent member states from including more substances within the 
scope of national regulations than are required by the Directive 
itself. In fact, the British Health and Safety Commission 
proposed to go further than the Directive by bringing 
intermediate products within the scope of national regulation. 
This, however, was opposed by the chemical industry, represented 
by the Chemical Industries Association (CIA) which argued that 
national regulation should not impose greater burdens on British 
industry than the Directive placed on its competitors. The CIA 
view prevailed thus ensuring that in this as in many other cases, 
Community regulation would in fact set the maximum as well as the 
minimum standard for national regulation (Haigh, 1984).
Similarly, German negotiators pressed for a European-wide 
scheme that would also provide the framework for an acceptable 
regulatory programme at home. German firms, concerned about 
overzealous enforcement by national inspectors and afraid of an 
environmentally conscious public opinion at home, wanted a full 
and explicit statement of their obligations to be defined at the 
EC level. Moreover, with more than 50 per cent of Germany's 




























































































and government officials wished to avoid the commercial obstacles 
that would arise from divergent national regulations (Brickman, 
Jasanoff and Ilgen, 1985).
The European chemical industry had another reason for 
supporting Community regulation. In 1976 the United States, 
without consulting their commercial partners, enacted the Toxic 
Substances Control Act (TSCA). The new regulation represented a 
serious threat for European exports to the lucrative American 
market. A European response to TSCA was clearly needed, and the 
Community was the logical forum for fashioning such a response. 
An EC-wide system of testing new chemical substances could serve 
as a model for negotiating standardized requirements covering the 
major chemical markets. In fact, the 1979 Directive has enabled 
the Community to speak with one voice in discussions with the 
United States and other OECD countries, and has strengthened the 
position of the European chemical industry in ensuring that the 
new American regulation does not create obstacles to its exports. 
There is little doubt that the ability of the Commission to enter 
into discussions with the USA has been greatly enhanced by the 
Directive, and it is unlikely that each European country on its 
own could do so effectively (Brickman, Jasanoff and Ilgen, 1985, 
277) .
At the beginning of this section we stated that it is 
becoming increasingly difficult to understand the domestic 
policies of member states without taking Community policies into 
consideration. The most obvious impact of Community regulations 
on national policies is a transfer of legislative competence to 
the Community since the principle of supremacy of Community law 
bars member states from passing laws inconsistent with the 
relevant EC directive. Hence it is also becoming more and more 
difficult to explain the development of Community regulatory 
policy-making as if the only important political actors were the 
national governments represented in the Council. Models of this 




























































































environmental process regulation would not occur in a system 
requiring unanimous consent of the member states, because states 
with relatively low standards would find it against their 
interest to agree to higher standards (Rehbinder and Stewart, 
1985). As the example of the 1979 directive on toxic substances 
shows, such state-centered models overlook many important factors 
such as the variety of industrial interests within one country; 
the advantages of "preemptive federalism" for multinational or 
export-oriented firms, both for avoiding inconsistent national 
regulations and for shifting regulatory decision-making to a less 
political, more technocratic arena; the importance of speaking 
with one voice in negotiating international regulatory issues; 
and last but not least the ability of the Commission to regulate 
even without adequate legal and budgetary resources.
3. Competition among Regulators
In the White Paper on the completion of the internal market, 
the Commission has proposed a new approach to regulation which 
includes among its key elements the strategy of "mutual 
recognition". Recognition of the rules and standards of one EC 
country by the other member states gives greater scope to 
national regulation and hence seems to falsify the hypothesis 
that the EC Commission attempts to maximise the scope of its 
competences. In this section I shall try to show that this is not 
the case, and in doing so I shall have to examine to what extent 
the competition among regulators which is implicit in the 
principle of mutual recognition, is in fact possible or desirable 
in a supranational system like the European Community.
The immediate reason for introducing the new strategy was to 
reduce the burden on the Commission in harmonizing national 
rules. Despite the impressive growth of Community regulation in 
the 1960s and 1970s, by 1985 the Commission had to acknowledge 
that the amount of work that remained to be done was such that 




























































































achieved by relying exclusively on the traditional harmonization 
approach. In the words of the Commission (1985, 18) "experience 
has shown that the alternative of relying on a strategy based 
totally on harmonization would be over-regulatory, would take a 
long time to implement, would be inflexible and could stifle 
innovation".
Harmonization, rather than unification, of national 
regulations had been the main objective of the Community in its 
first 25 years. Harmonization is the adjustment of national rules 
to the requirements of a common market. Its characteristic 
instrument is the directive because this instrument only 
specifies the regulatory objectives to be achieved, leaving the 
choice of methods to the member states.
To overcome the limitations of the traditional approach, the 
Commission's White Paper introduced a new strategy with the 
following key elements: mutual recognition of national 
regulations and standards; legislative harmonization to be 
restricted by laying down essential health and safety 
requirements which will be obligatory on all member states; 
gradual replacement of national product specifications by 
European standards issued by the Comité Européen de la 
Normalisation (CEN) or by sectoral European organizations such as 
C E N E L E C  in the e l e c t r i c a l  s e c t o r  and CEPT in the 
telecommunications sector.
In essence, the White Paper proposes a conceptual distinction 
between matters where harmonization is essential and those where 
it is sufficient that there be mutual recognition of the 
equivalence of the various basic requirements laid down under 
national law. This line of reasoning was first introduced by the 
European Court of Justice in the famous Cassis de Dijon judgment 
of 1979. The Court had stated that a member state may. not in 
principle prohibit the sale in its territory of a product 
lawfully produced and marketed in another member state even if 





























































































requirements which differ from those imposed on its domestic 
products —  except when the prohibition is justified by the need 
to ensure effective fiscal supervision, to protect public health 
or the environment, or to ensure the fairness of financial 
transactions.
Given the cumbersome nature of the Community decision-making 
process, the new approach has considerable advantages, at least 
in theory. Unlike harmonization, mutual recognition does not 
involve the transfer of powers to the Community but, at most, 
restricts the freedom of action of member states. Moreover, the 
emphasis on mutual recognition avoids all the difficulties linked 
to the necessity of drafting directives so as to suit the 
substantive concerns of twelve different actors or the particular 
requirements of their legal system. Finally, the new approach 
creates a competition among national regulators which, like 
competition among producers of goods and services, should provide 
an efficient way of assessing the costs and benefits of different 
methods of regulation and increase the range of choice available 
to consumers.
some, the competition among national rules made possible 
by mutual recognition is the strongest argument in favour of the 
new approach. The advantages expected from this kind of 
competition are indeed likely to be realised when regulation 
deals with information asymmetries (Kay and Vickers, 1990) or in 
the case of undifferentiated products which consumers are 
competent to evaluate. For example, if German TV standards are 
less costly than French standards but consumers regard German TV 
sets as essentially equivalent to the more expensive French sets, 
French producers will lose business to their German competitors. 
Hence they will bring pressures on their government to modify 
national standards. If other countries find themselves in a 
similar situation, competition among rules will eventually lead 






























































































But there are many products for which mutual recognition is 
far from being optimal. First, as already noted, the consumer 
must be able to evaluate the relevant cost-guality tradeoffs. For 
many products and services this is not a realistic assumption. In 
such cases, not the consumers but public authorities will decide 
whether certain price-guality or price-risk combinations are 
acceptable. However, national regulators tend to raise objections 
against each other almost routinely, as shown by the experience 
with the mutual recognition of new medical drugs discussed below. 
This and similar examples suggest a general problem with mutual 
recognition: when decisions are made by a handful of national 
authorities rather than by millions of consumers , strategic 
(oligopolistic) behaviour replaces free market competition —  a 
phenomenon discussed in more detail in the next section.
Second, mutual recognition of technical standards may be 
least satisfactory in precisely those areas where the potential 
gains from the Single Market are highest (Gatsios and Seabright, 
1989). This is because it is often convenient to have uniform 
technical standards in order to enable interconnection of 
specialized equipment, as in the case of telecommunications. The 
problem is particularly acute when several standards (like the 
PAL and SECAM standards for colour TV) are equally satisfactory 
from a technical viewpoint so that there is no obvious reason why 
one standard should be given preference. The essential 
equivalence of many technical standards explains why in the 
telecom sector, for example, the industry's regulators —  usually 
the national PPTTs -- have traditionally been able to sustain 
their restrictive procurement practices by demanding observance 
of national standards reinforced by discriminatory certification 
procedures.
Recent developments in the field of high definition TV show 
how difficult agreement about technical standards continues to 
be. The D2 MAC interim standard imposed by a 1986 EC Directive 




























































































Britain who opted for the older, more common PAL standard. A 
compromise seems now to have emerged, but only because the 
C o m m i s s i o n  has p romised to pay some of the costs of 
"simulcasting" in both standards at once. It is not yet clear 
whether broadcasting in D2MAC will be made mandatory after a 
certain date, or perhaps only after a certain proportion of 
satellite dishes and televisions can receive it.
The time dimension, although seldom considered, is essential 
in evaluating the efficiency of competitive processes. Assume a 
situation where it is reasonable to think that competition among 
national rules will eventually eliminate the less efficient forms 
of regulation, leading to ex-oost■ rather than ex-ante . 
harmonization. Unfortunately, it will be usually impossible to 
estimate the speed of convergence toward the superior method. If 
convergence to the most efficient type of regulation is slow, 
producers in different countries may become committed to a 
particular system of standards which it would be extremely costly 
to change at a later stage —  a kind of "first-mover 
disadvantage" (Williamson, 1975).
Another source of potential difficulties, related to the 
strategic behaviour mentioned above, has been noted by Gatsios 
and Seabright. Even assuming that mutual recognition of existing 
standards is nearly optimal, national authorities may bias their 
decisions on future standards toward low level of quality or 
protection. Because approved products may be sold throughout the 
Community, national authorities know that much of the harm due to 
low standards will fall on consumers in other member states, 
while the cost savings will accrue to their own producers 
(Gatsios and Seabright, 1989: 43).
It is important to realize that the same danger can arise 
even in areas, like the regulation of financial and professional 
services, where mutual recognition seems to be most appropriate. 
Thus, under the Second Banking Directive banks licensed in one 




























































































and Own Funds Directive attempt to ensure that bank licensing is 
conducted on a reasonably common basis. However, the application 
of the home country principle to the approval and supervision of 
banking services, coupled with the application of the host 
country principle for deposit insurance schemes, creates 
opportunities for strategic regulation by national authorities. 
As in the case of product standards, national regulators have 
incentives to set weak standards since foreign tax payers will 
pay the bill in case of bank failure. A process of "competitive 
deregulation" may set in as each country attempts to give 
competitive advantages to its domestically licensed institutions 
(Vives, 1990).
is clear that the principle of mutual recognition cannot 
be relied upon to manage negative externalities w i t h  
international effects such as air or water pollution crossing 
national boundaries. There is also fairly general agreement among 
the experts that the competitive structure of the integrated 
European market will have to be protected by central institutions 
of the Community against national interests in anti-competitive 
regulations. This implies that the competition policy of the 
internal market should be monopolised by the Community. Only for 
products with a national distribution is a national competition 
policy conceivable.^
Finally, let us come back to the instructive example of 
medical drugs. For more than two decades, the Commission has 
attempted to harmonise national regulations for the approval of 
new medical drugs. The present system includes a set of 
harmonised criteria for testing new products, and the mutual 
recognition of toxicological and clinical trials —  provided they 
are conducted according to EC rules. In order to speed up the 
process of mutual recognition, a "multi-state drug application 
procedure" (MSAP) was introduced in 1975. Under the MSAP, a 
company that has received a marketing authorisation from the 




























































































recognition of that approval by at least five other countries. 
The agencies of the countries nominated by the company must 
approve or raise objections within 120 days. In case of 
objections, the Committee for Proprietary Medicinal Products 
(CPMP) -- a group which includes experts from member states and 
Commission representatives —  has to be notified. The CPMP must 
express its opinion within 60 days; within another 30 days it may 
be overruled by the national agency that has raised objections.
The procedure has not worked well. Actual decision times are 
much longer than those prescribed by the 1975 Directive, and 
national regulators do not appear to be bound either by decisions 
of other regulatory bodies, or by the opinions of the CPMP. 
Because of these disappointing results, the procedure has been 
revised in 1983. Now only two countries have to be nominated in 
order to be able to apply for a multi-state approval. But even 
the new procedure has not succeeded in streamlining the approval 
process, since national regulators raise objections against each 
other almost routinely. In sum, mutual recognition of national 
drug approvals has proved to be extremely difficult. The problem 
is that differences among national schools of medicine, different 
national attitudes in the evaluation of risks and benefits, and 
differently perceived needs for new drugs lead to divergent 
interpretations of drug approvals despite the fact that they have 
been prepared according to a standardised European format 
(Kaufer, 1990).
These difficulties have finally convinced the European 
Commission to propose the establishment of a European Agency for 
the Evaluation of Medicinal Products and the creation of a new 
centralized Community procedure, compulsory for biotechnology 
products and certain types of veterinary medicines, and available 
on an optional basis for other products, leading to a Community 
authorization (Commission of the European Communities, 1990).
The above discussion is not meant to deny that mutual 




























































































market, especially in connection with market failures due to 
insufficient information.̂ However the principle can be effective, 
not in place of, but in conjunction with, European regulation. If 
it were possible to avoid centralization by inducing the member 
states to accept the principle, we should observe a more 
extensive use of mutual recognition in mature federal systems 
like the United States. In fact, mutual recognition presupposes a 
higher degree of cooperation among member states than the 
commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution requires among 
individual states. The commerce clause has been interpreted by 
the U.S. Supreme Court to allow each state to insist on its own 
product quality standards -- unless the subject has been pre­
empted by federal regulation, or unless the state standards would 
unduly burden interstate commerce (Hufbauer, 1990). Is it 
realistic to assume that the members of a community as varied in 
language, history, political culture and legal traditions as the 
EC, are willing and able to cooperate more closely than the 
members of the American federation?/-
It is hard to imagine that the authors of the White Paper had 
not anticipated at least some of the difficulties discussed here. 
It cannot have escaped policy-makers in Brussels that mutual 
recognition is too dependent on the good will and altruism of 
national actors to be more than an auxiliary solution to the 
various kinds of market failure that can be expected to arise in 
an integrated European market. Supporters and advocates of the 
Community's "new approach" to regulation like to present it as an 
application of the subsidiarity principle of federalism: the 
higher level of government should intervene only to provide 
public goods that lower levels cannot supply. But this is 
disingenuous; concepts like public good, externality, public 
interest have no generally accepted meaning in a system which is 
at best pre-federal and where the sovereignty of the member 





























































































</The practical conclusion can only be that the "new approach" 
is less a new and promising strategy than an attempt to reduce 
the burden on the Commission in harmonizing national rules; a 
tactical move meant to take advantage of the political appeal of 
deregulation, and to rally all available forces around the banner 
of 1992. In launching a new, ambitious programme of economic 
integration it was both wise and politically expedient not to 
emphasise that while the completion of the Internal Market calls 
for massive deregulation at the national level, this would have 
to be followed, in many cases, by re-regulation at Community 
level
Logically speaking, however, re-regulation at Community level 
is not the only possibility. In theory, it would be possible for 
the member states to avoid an expansion of Community competences 
by coordinating their regulatory policies so as to take into 
'account (explicitly or tacitly) one another's interests. Mutual 
recognition is a weak, largely passive form of cooperation; 
policy coordination 'is considerably stronger and hence could 
conceivably provide an adequate regulatory regime for the 
Internal Market. We explore this possibility in the next section.
4. Coase Theorem. Prisoners'Dilemma and Regulatory Failure 
The rationale for supra-national regulation is regulatory failure 
rather than market failure. As Ronald Coase (1960) argued in a 
famous article, the presence of externalities alone does not 
necessarily prevent effective coordination among independent 
actors. If national regulators were willing and able to take into 
account the international repercussions of their policy choices; 
if they had perfect information of one another's intentions; and 
if the costs of organising and monitoring policy coordination 
were negligible, market failures could be managed in a 
cooperative fashion without the necessity of delegating 




























































































International regulatory failure occurs when one or more of 
these conditions are not satisfied, and it is important to 
observe that this can happen even in the case of purely local 
market failures. For example, problems of safety regulation for 
construction of local buildings create no inter-country 
externalities and thus, according to the traditional view of the 
matter expressed by the principle of subsidiarity, should be left 
to the local authorities. However, if safety regulation specifies 
a particular material only produced in that locality, it may 
amount to a trade barrier and thus have negative external 
effects. In this case, local regulation of a local market failure 
creates an international regulatory failure. In general, 
strategic behaviour, imperfect information, and positive 
transaction costs are the main obstacles to successful 
coordination of national (or sub-national) regulatory policies.
Within the context of EC institutions, "coordination" means 
joint and interdependent actions without legal force: renegers 
cannot be taken to the European Court of Justice (Emerson, 1989). 
The most important example is the European Monetary System (EMS) 
in which participants behave according to rules which are not 
enforceable in ropean law.
The relative success of the EMS shows that supra-national 
policy coordination is not impossible. At the same time it must 
be noted that even after the European Single Act, monetary policy 
cooperation has not yet crossed the threshold of stronger 
institutionalisation. The delay until today of the transition of 
the EMS into its second stage -- characterised by an advanced 
degree of pooling of the official international reserves of the 
participants and by the consolidation and extension of the credit 
mechanisms through a European Monetary Fund —  is probably due to 
the fact that the EMS cannot impose any convergence constraints 





























































































At any rate, the EMS is a special case of doubtful relevance 
to the problems of regulatory policy coordination discussed in 
this paper. The theory of hegemonic stability (Kindleberger, 
1973; Gilpin, 1987) is quite sufficient to explain the emergence 
and stability of the system. According to this theory, the 
formation of international regimes normally depends on hegemony 
("leadership" or "responsibility" in the terminology of 
Kindleberger) of one country, and their maintenance requires 
continued hegemony. In fact, the initiative for the establishment 
of the EMS came from the German, and to a lesser extent the 
French, government —  rather than from a collective choice of all 
the member states of the EC —  and the viability of the system 
depends crucially on its asymmetry. It is well known that while 
the EMS has only had a minor influence on German monetary policy, 
the other participants often had to adjust their monetary policy 
in order to defend their DM exchange rate. It has been argued 
that the EMS, as a European institution, should be as symmetric 
as possible in order to reflect the interests of all its members. 
However, the demand for symmetry clashes with the basic 
proposition that in a fixed-exchange rate regime only one country 
can, in the long run, determine its own monetary policy, which 
then constitutes the anchor that ties down the price level and 
money supply in the other countries (Gros and Thygesen, 1988). 
Hence, the EMS must be an asymmetric system anchored by German 
monetary policy if the exchange rates are to be really fixed —  
as both economic theory and the theory of hegemonic stability 
demand.
It seems highly unlikely that Germany, or any other member of 
the EC, would be willing to provide leadership in regulatory 
matters -- or that leadership would be accepted by the other 
member states. There are many reasons why one cannot count on the 
initiative of a "lead country" to achieve cooperation in 
regulatory policy. Of special importance to environmental 




























































































A hazard is said to be one-directional when the risk creator(s) 
are in one country and the victim(s) of pollution in one or more 
other countries, for example when pollution travels by river 
downstream into one country from a site upstream in another.
The most straightforward case of a one-directional hazard is 
when only two countries are involved, the effects are 
acknowledged to be one-directional by all parties, ownership of 
the transmitting medium is not in question, and damage and 
control costs are easily measured and relatively insignificant 
for both countries. These where the characteristics when, in 
1935, the Trail Smelter metal refinery in British Columbia, 
Canada, was found to have discharged sulphurous gases that 
damaged farm crops across the border in the state of Washington, 
USA. Despite the relative simplicity of this case', it took many 
years before the International Court of Justice in the Hague 
resolved it by finding the Canadian government liable for 
$350,000.
Pollution of the Rhine River is an illustration of more 
complex factors that can come into play in one-directional 
hazards. In this case, several countries are involved, damage and 
control costs are difficult to estimate and are relatively large, 
and economic aspects cannot be separated from environmental 
considerations. This complexity is reflected in the variety of 
institutional arrangements that have evolved. In 1815, the 
Congress of Vienna established the Commission of the Rhine River, 
primarily to handle problems of navigation. In 1956, the 
Convention of the Canalization of the Moselle, a tributary of the 
Rhine, set the precedent of environment-related agreements among 
the nations sharing the Rhine River basin. In 1963, after 17 
years of negotiations, a five-nation International Commission for 
the Protection of the Rhine was formed, followed by a tripartite 
commission set up in 1975 by France, the FRG, and Switzerland. 
These arrangements have failed to produce a satisfactory result 




























































































carried 360 kilos of chlorides per second in the early 1980s, a 
six-fold increase from the levels measured at the beginning of 
the century (Caldwell, 1984).
As these examples suggest, even when international actors 
agree to cooperate, they have incentives not to enforce the 
agreement too strictly. The well-known Prisoner's Dilemma 
captures the essence of the problem. In this game, each player 
has two strategies: to cooperate or to defect from the agreement. 
The payoff matrix is as follows:
Player 2
Cooperate Defect
Cooperate R,R S, T
Defect T,S P,P
Payoff ordering: T>R>P>S, with 2R>S+T>2P.
The latter condition is added so that the game is a standard 
Prisoner's Dilemma in which (Cooperate, Cooperate) and (Defect, 
Defect) are the best and worst possible outcomes in terms of the 
sum of payoffs. Each player has a dominant strategy, namely to 
defect, but the equilibrium payoff (P,P) is worse than (R,R) —  
the payoff they could achieve by cooperating -- and indeed 
collectively worse than any other payoff. Moreover, because the 
equilibrium is a dominant strategy equilibrium, the information 
structure of the game does not matter. If Player 1 is allowed to 
know the move of the other player before making his own, the 
equilibrium is unchanged. Player 2 still chooses Defect. knowing 
that Player 1 will surely choose Defect afterwards (Rasmusen, 
1989).
The conclusion that defecting is a dominant strategy depends 




























































































small number of times. The theory of infinitely repeated games 
proves that cooperation between several players can be sustained 
by the threat that if one player breaks the agreement, the others 
will retaliate by reverting to the non-cooperative situation. 
However, as Rasmusen (1989:96) observes, this is a purely 
mathematical result and hence the strategies that generate 
particular patterns of behaviour may be unreasonable. Two 
problems reduce the practical significance of the theoretical 
conclusion: discounting and incomplete information. Given a 
positive discount rate, the present gain from defecting is 
weighted more heavily and future gains from cooperation more 
lightly. If the discount rate is very high the iterated game 
almost returns to the single-play Prisoner's Dilemma. Democratic 
governments usually have short-time horizons and therefore strong 
incentives to breach agreements for short-term advantages. This 
is because a democratic government cannot trade present votes for 
future votes the way a voter can trade present income for future 
income. Hence, in Anthony Downs' words, "no government aims at 
maximizing a stream of incomes composed of separate incomes for 
each of many periods . . . government has no discount rate of its 
own to apply to its own income —  an income measured in votes" 
(Downs, 1957: 174-75).
Lack of information is an even more serious problem in 
enforcing supranational cooperative agreements about regulatory 
issues. There are at least three reasons why it is difficult to 
observe whether agreements are being properly kept or not. First, 
regulation is a highly complex type of policy-making in which 
technical, economic, and political elements are closely 
intertwined. Hence the reasons for particular regulatory 
decisions can seldom be made fully explicit and thus objectively 
verifiable (Majone, 1982). Second, measurement problems are 
extremely serious in some areas of regulation like pollution 
control. Because of quickly changing atmospheric conditions, for 




























































































threshold value has been exceeded, and for how long. The 
difficulties are compounded if ambient quality standards rather 
than effluent standards are used as regulatory instruments.
The third and most important reason why it is difficult to 
observe whether or not agreements are being properly kept, is 
that much economic and social regulation is discretionary -- in 
practice if not in theory. Because regulators lack information 
that only regulated firms have and because governments are 
reluctant, for political reasons, to impose excessive costs on 
industry, bargaining is an essential feature of the process of 
regulatory enforcement. Regardless of what the law says, the 
process of regulation is not simply one where the regulators 
command and the regulated obey. A "market" is created, so to 
speak, in which bureaucrats and those subject to regulation 
bargain over the precise obligations of the latter (Peacock, 
1984:3). Because bargaining is so pervasive, it may be extremely 
difficult for an outside observer to determine whether the 
spirit, or only the letter, of an international regulation has 
been violated.
When it is difficult to observe whether member states are 
making an honest effort to enforce a cooperative agreement, the 
agreement is not credible. The issue of credibility plays a large 
role in discussions on coordination of macroeconomic policies. 
For the reasons just given, credibility is probably even more 
important for the success of regulatory policy coordination. 
Sometimes member states have problems of credibility, not just in 
the eyes of each other as in the Prisoners1 Dilemma situation, but 
in the eyes of third parties, such as regulated firms or 
governments outside the Community. For example, where pollution 
has international effects and fines impose significant 
competitive disadvantages on firms that compete internationally, 
firms are likely to believe that national regulators will be 
unwilling to prosecute them as rigorously if they determine the 




























































































supervision. Hence the transfer of regulatory powers to a 
supranational authority like the EC Commission, by making more 
stringent regulation credible, may improve the behaviour of 
regulated firms (Gatsios and Seabright, 1989: 49).
The issue of credibility of national regulators is closely 
linked to the problem of "regulatory capture". Following a 
seminal paper by Stigler (1971), many economists have argued that 
regulatory agencies, sooner or later, become captured by the very 
interests they are supposed to regulate. It is true that the 
phenomenon is not as general as Stigler and others seem to 
suggest; for example, there is little evidence of regulatory 
capture in the areas of environmental protection, consumer 
protection, and occupational health and safety (Majone, 1989). 
Nevertheless, the danger of regulatory capture is a real one in 
the case of economic regulation and thus poses a serious threat 
to the credibility of international agreements.
Partly for this reason, it was suggested above that 
competition policy should be set and enforced by tht. Community. 
In fact, the EC Commission has consistently taken a stricter pro­
competition stance than national authorities like the British 
M o n o p o l i e s  a n d  M e r g e r s  C o m m i s s i o n  and the G e r m a n  
Bundeskartellamt. EC authorities are less vulnerable to lobbying 
by firms and trade unions; this is a considerable advantage in 
cases involving merger authorisations and state aids to industry. 
Another advantage has been noted by Gatsion and Seabright 
(1989:50). Because the EC is involved in the regulation of a 
large number of firms throughout the Community, it has much more 
to gain by being tough in any individual case than a national 
regulator; weak enforcement would destroy its credibility in the 
eyes of more firms. Thus it may be more willing to enforce 
sanctions than a member state would be, even if its direct costs 
and benefits of doing so are no different.
Credibility is not uniformly distributed among member states 




























































































credibility because they lack, or are perceived as lacking, the 
scientific knowledge, technical expertise and administrative 
skills to regulate effectively in certain areas. This credibility 
problem explains, at least in part, the disappointing results of 
the multi-state procedure for the approval of new medical drugs, 
see above. To take another example, until recently most countries 
of the EC lacked the legal and administrative instruments to 
regulate monopolies and mergers. In such cases, delegation of 
regulatory powers to the EC can achieve economies of scale in 
research and administration, and improve the quality of 
regulation in the Community, even when no international 
prisoners' dilemmas are involved.
5. Institutional and Policy Implications
We conclude this paper by drawing some practical implications 
from the arguments developed in the preceding pages. Our analysis 
of regulatory failures strongly suggests that, despite the 
theoretical and political appeal of decentralisation in a 
community of nations as varied as the EC, many regulatory powers 
will have to be surrendered by the national governments after 
1992. Even in areas like the regulation of financial and 
professional services and (more problematically) product 
standards regulation, where the "new approach" has good chances 
of succeeding, European regulation will still be necessary to 
curb excessive or counter-productive regulation by national 
authorities.
Although the potential gains from a transfer of regulatory 
powers to the Community could be considerable, there are also 
serious risks. In this paper the concept of regulatory failure 
has been applied to the national level, but various types of 
failure are clearly possible also at the European level, with 
even more serious consequences. Present methods of regulatory 
decision making in Brussels suffer from a number of defects. 




























































































fields are the absence of central coordination, leading to 
serious inconsistencies across and within regulatory programmes; 
lack of rational procedures for selecting priorities; 
insufficient attention paid to the cost-effectiveness of 
individual rules; inadequate staffing and insufficient research 
capabilities.
The Community regulatory process also suffers from a lack of 
political oversight, not only by the European Parliament but also 
by the President of the Commission and by the Council. The lack 
of political guidance and control will become increasingly 
serious, since the growing complexity of regulation requires 
greater reliance on standing committees of experts and, 
eventually, the creation of specialized agencies. We mentioned 
above the Commission's proposal for the establishment of a 
European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products. The 
Council has recently approved the establishment of a European 
Environmental Agency, although this is more concerned with 
coordinating research and monitoring environment \1 conditions 
than with actual regulation. An independent European agency to 
regulate monopolistic concentrations, mergers, and state aid to 
industry has frequently been suggested. The proposed agency 
should be independent not only of national governments but also 
of the EC Commission since the latter can be influenced by 
national interests through the Council.
/""Regulatory commissions are the logical consequence of the 
adoption of a regulatory mode of policy-making. Regulation is not 
achieved simply by passing a law, but requires detailed knowledge 
of, and intimate involvement with, the regulated activities. 
Thus, a commitment to regulation implies, sooner or later, the 
creation of specialised agencies capable of fact-finding, rule- 
making, and enforcement. At the present stage of development of 
the Community, however, the idea of European agencies still faces 




























































































means must be found to improve the quality of regulatory policy­
making.
When regulatory policies require a substantial amount of 
local knowledge for effective enforcement, decentralisation is,
centrally determined policies often provides only a partial 
answer since it involves all the problems of monitoring and 
control mentioned above in connection with Prisoners'Dilemma 
situations. Instead of a simple delegation of implementing 
authority to the member states, it would be necessary to devise 
institutional arrangements allowing constrained implementation of 
Community policies by the member states. For example, it may be 
possible to introduce some weak version of the American "State 
Implementation Plans" and "State Capacity Assurance Plans", 
whereby states have to demonstrate that they have the technical 
and administrative capacity to implement federal regulation —  or
It is also important to iep in mind that the optimal' 
assignment of policies and responsibilities between different 
levels of government does not have to coincide with existing 
national boundaries. For example, there may be significant 
externalities and a need for coordination between some, but not 
all, regions within a country or group of countries. A model 
which deserves particular attention in this context is that of 
consortia or "compacts" among several states (or regions within 
different states) sharing similar problems; for example, in areas 
like transboundary water and air pollution, waste management, and 
so on. By pooling their financial, technical, and administrative 
resources, these states or regions are in a better position to 
deal satisfactorily with their regulatory problems than either by 
acting alone or by relying exclusively on centralized regulation 
which cannot be closely tailored to their specific needs. In this 
way it might be possible to achieve a nearly optimal combination
in principle, advisable. However, decentralised administration of
































































































of flexibility in regulation and economies of scale in policy 
formation and implementation.
reaching consequences. Instead of the traditional dichotomy of 
Community or national regulation, with its artificial separation 
of fact-finding and rule-making from enforcement, we would have a 
system of different, but compatible, regulatory regimes 
coordinated and monitored by a small regulatory body at Community 
level. Among the tasks of this body would be improving the fit 
between the different subsystems, providing technical and 
administrative assistance, facilitating the diffusion of 
experiences and policy innovations and, last but not least, 
acting as "regulator of last resort". The American experience 
shows that the emergence of regional compacts is greatly 
facilitated by the existence of a. regulator of last resort —  
again, a conclusion wholly consistent with the analysis developed 
in the preceding pages'^
Something could also be done within the present institutional 
framework in order to ensure a correct choice of priorities and 
overall consistency of Community regulation. As noted above, the 
regulatory process in the EC suffers from a lack of political 
oversight. To correct this defect, it would be necessary to set 
up a "regulatory clearing house" at the highest level. 
Directorates-General (DGs) would be asked to submit annually 
draft regulatory programmes to the clearing house for review. 
When disagreements or serious inconsistencies arise, the 
President of the Commission or a "Working Committee on 
Regulation" would be asked to intervene. By extending 
centralised control over the regulatory agenda of the DGs, this 
review process would help the Commission shape a consistent set 
of regulatory measures to submit to the Council and the European 
Parliament. The usefulness of the procedure as a tool of 
managerial and policy control could be enhanced by coordinating 
the regulatory review with the normal budgetary review, thus




























































































linking the level of budgetary appropriations to the cost- 





























































































Becker, Gary, 1983: "A Theory of Competition among Pressure
Groups for Political Influence", Quarterly Journal of 
Economics■ VOl.98, 371-400.
Berman, Harold J., 1983: Law and Revolution. Cambridge, M A : 
Harvard University Press.
Breyer, Stephen, 1982: Regulation and its Reform. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press.
Brickman, Ronald, S.Jasanoff, T.Ilgen, 1985: Controlling
Chemicals. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
Caldwell, Lynton, K., 1984: International Environmental Policy. 
Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press.
Coase, Ronald, H., 1960: "The Problem of Social Cost", The
Journal of Law and Economics. vol.3, 1-44.
Coase, Ronald, H., 1988: The Firm, the Market and the L a w .
Chicago, 111.: The University of Chicago Press.
Commission of the European Communities, 1985: Cc,'Dieting the 
Internal Market. COM(85), 310 final, Luxembourg: Office 
for Official Publications of the European Communities.
Commission of the European Communities, 1990: Future System for 
the Free Movement of Medicinal Drugs in the European 
Community ■ COM(90) 283 final, Luxembourg: Office for 
Official Publications of the European Communities.
Downs, Anthony, 1957: An Economic Theory of Democracy■ New York: 
Harper.
Elliott, Donald E., B .A.Ackerman, J.C.Millian, 1985: "Toward a 
Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of 
Environmental Law", Journal of Law. Economics and 
Organization. vol.l (2):313-40.
Emerson, Michael, 1989: "Where to Regulate" in "The Appropriate 
Level of Regulation in Europe: Local, National or
Community Wide? A Roundtable Discussion", Economic 
Policy. 467-81.
Gatsios, Konstantine and Paul Seabright, 1989: "Regulation in the 





























































































Gilpin, Robert, 1987: The Political Economy of International 
Relations. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Gros, Daniel and Niels Thygesen, 1988: The EMS. Brussels, Centre 
for European Policy Studies.
Haigh, Nigel, 1984: EEC Environmental Policy and Britain. London: 
Environmental Data Services.
Hufbauer, Gary, C., ed., 1990: Europe 1992. Washington, D.C.: The 
Brookings Institution.
L. /Joskow, Paul J. and Roger G.Noll, 1981: "Regulation in Theory and 
Practice: An Overview", in Gary Fromm, ed. , Studies in 
Public Regulation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1-65.
Kaufer, Erich, 1990: "The Regulation of New Product Development
in the Drug Industry", in Giandomenico Ma j one, ed., 
Deregulation or R e - r e a u 1 ation? . London: Pinter
Publishers, 153-75.
Kay, John and John Vickers, 1990: "Regulatory Reform: An
Appraisal", in Giandomenico Majone, ed., Deregulation or 
Re-regulation?. London: Pinter Publishers, 223-51.
Kindleberger, Charles, P., 1973: The World in Depression.
Berkeley, CA. University of California Press.
MacKay, Robert J., J.C.Miller III, B.Yandle, eds. , 1987: Public 
Choice and Regulation■ Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution.
Majone, Giandomenico, 1982: "The Uncertain Logic of Standard 
Setting", Zeitschrift für Umweltpolitik. 4, 305-23.
Majone, Giandomenico, 1989: Evidence, Argument and Persuasion in 
the Policy Process. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Majone, Giandomenico, ed., 1990: Deregulation or Re-regulation? . 
London: Pinter Publishers.
Niskanen, William A., 1971: Bureaucracy and Representative
Government. Chicago, 111.: Aldine-Atherton.
Padoa-Schioppa, Tommaso et al, 1987: Efficiency. Stability and 
Eguitv: A Strategy for the Evolution of the Economic
System of the Community. Oxford: England: Oxford
University Press.





























































































Pelkmans, Jacques, 1989: "Regulation and the Single Market: An 
Economic Perspective", in Horst Siebert, ed., The 
Completion of the Internal Market. Tubingen, J.C.B. Mohr, 
91-117.
Peltzman, Sam, 1976: "Toward a More General T h e o r y  of
Regulation", Journal of Law and Economics, vol.19, 211- 
40.
Peltzman, Sam, 1989: "The Economic Theory of Regulation after a 
Decade of Deregulation", Brookings Papers on Economic 
Activity. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1-41.
Phillips, Susan M. and J.Richard Zecher, 1981: The SEC and the 
Public Interest. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Rasmusen, Eric, 1989: Games and Information. Oxford, England: 
Basil B1ackwe11.
Rehbinder, Eckhart and Richard Steward, 1985 : Environmental
Protection Policy. Berlin: de Gruyter
Stigler, George J. , 1971: "The Theory of Economic Regulation", 
Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, vol.2, 
3-21.
Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1988: Economics of the Public Sector. New 
York: W.W.Norton, second edition.
Vipod, P. A . , 1989 : "Banking Regulation in Europe: European
Community and British Banking Regulation in the Context 
of Change Within the Financial Services Industry", paper 
presented at the Panel on Deregulation. Reregulation and 
the International Dimension. Paris: ECRP Joint Sessions.
Vives, Xavier, 1990: "Regulatory Reform in European Banking",
mimeo.































































































EUI Working Papers are published and distributed by the 
European University Institute, Florence
Copies can be obtained free of charge -  depending on the availability of
stocks -  from:
The Publications Officer 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana
1-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) 
Italy



























































































Publications of the European University Institute
To The Publications Officer
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana
1-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FT) 
Italy
From Name . .
Address
□  Please send me a complete list of EUI Working Papers
□  Please send me a complete list of EUI book publications
□  Please send me the EUI brochure Academic Year 1990/91





































































































EUI Working Papers as from 1990
As from January 1990, the EUI Working Papers Series is divided into six 
sub-series, each series is numbered individually (i.e. EUI Working Paper 
HEC No. 90/1; ECO No. 90/1; LAW No. 90/1; SPS No. 90/1; EPU No. 





































































































Educational Expansion and 
Changes in Women's Entry into 
Marriage and Motherhood in the 
Federal Republic of Germany
SPS No. 90/3 
Nico WILTERDINK 
Where Nations Meet: National 




Changes in Educational 
Opportunities in the Federal 
Republic of Germany. A 
Longitudinal Study of Cohorts 
Bom Between 1916 and 1965
SPS No. 90/5 
Antonio LA SPINA 
Some Reflections on Cabinets and 
Policy-Making: Types of Policy, 
Features of Cabinets, and Their 
Consequences for Policy Outputs
SPS No. 90/6 
Giandomenico MAJONE 
Cross-National Sources of 
Regulatory Policy-Making 




Is the German Dual System a 





Karl Ulrich MAYER 
Expansion on the Tertiary Sector 
and Social Inequality.
Is there a New Service Proletariat 








Market Integration and 
Regulation: Europe after 1992
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
■
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
